видео: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=oaJXjCRGE4c

I am Steve Frishman. I'm a geologist. I've worked since 1987 as a technical consultant to the State of Nevada in overseeing the national nuclear waste program that has ended up centered on Yucca Mountain. Prior to coming to Nevada, I was director of the Texas Nuclear Waste Programs Office. Before the government settled on the Nevada site, they were looking at sites around the country. And there were two sites in Texas and so I directed the program that was the equivalent of the program here in Nevada. And in 1987, when the law changed, and they selected Nevada as the only site, and everything else was shut down, I knew the director of the Nevada program. I knew the governor. And they asked me to come and work as a consultant for them. So I've been here since 1987. I started out being interested in the high-level waste program. I was appointed to an advisory committee in Texas where I was the vice president of the Texas environmental coalition, and I was appointed to an advisory committee that the state put together to advise the Texas congressional delegation on the writing of the nuclear waste policy act. So I've been involved in this since the very beginning of the national policy effort to do something about high-level waste. So it's pretty much been my old life.

Oleg: May I ask you to describe the key point of the Yucca Mountain project, I mean from the beginning what was the motivation?

Steve: The US government for a couple of decades had been looking around the country very quietly, looking for sites in 1957, the National Academy of Sciences put together a very large meeting, where it was thought that salts deposits might be a good place to dispose of waste. And for years the federal government quietly looked around the country at some of the major salts deposits and as soon as they got caught by state governments and governors, they got thrown out. They were trying to sneak in. And because they knew they wouldn't be popular. The governors caught them and threw them out. So the basis for the nuclear energy policy act was to have a national policy so that the government wasn't sneaking around looking for sites that upset people. The reason Yucca Mountain actually became one of the sites is that in 1977, because the government was having a hard time even getting to look at places, the General Accounting Office, which is an advisory panel for Congress, said well, maybe you should be looking at atomic energy defense facilities, because those are pretty well accepted where they are. They are somewhat popular because they employ a lot of people. And they've already had issues of contamination. They understand how to deal with radiation. So they said, look at atomic nuclear defense facilities and out of that came both the Hanford site in Washington, which is where most of the reactors that produce plutonium for the weapons program and also the Nevada test site. So they started looking. They picked a site at Hanford. And they also started looking around the Nevada test site. There's a lot of different geology at the Nevada test site. They looked at granite. They were mostly looking at location rather than anything else. We know that for most of the Nevada test site, the water table is very deep. So there's a lot of distance down to the water table. So if you're going to bury stuff deep, it may be attractive.

So they looked around the site and there's some debate about this, but I followed it pretty carefully.

And what they did was everyplace they seem to stop and get interested, people in the weapons program said, we have used that, so it's contaminated, or were planning to use it, so they kept getting chased around the test site. So they finally ended up with Yucca Mountain, which is just off the western edge of the Nevada test site. But the access to it is through the test site. Or the easiest access. So Yucca Mountain was essentially a default site at the Nevada test site. And they originally were talking about, even though the water table is about 1,000 feet below the top of the mountain, they were originally thinking about looking at below the water table. And then said, why would we go so deep. And they said, we have 1000 feet above the water table. It's very dry. So why don't we think about a repository above the water table, even though no one had ever thought about it that way before. So it sort of became not only a default site, but also a default technology. Once we had it, regardless of anything that turned up, that seemed to be slightly add verse, they would always say, we don't want to lose an otherwise good site, we'll find out a way to deal with this, and how to deal with that. So it's become a default site, a default technology. And ultimately we figured out, the geology just doesn't work. What you're looking for is geologic isolation of the waste, because the site can't isolate waste.

Oleg: What was the position against the site?

Steve: Working with state and contractors we had, we very quickly figured out that the rock at Yucca Mountain is very fractured, which makes the whole site very porous, meaning water is going to run down through the site very quickly. And it doesn't rain a lot, but there's still water. And we get some snow on top of Yucca Mountain. We very quickly came to the position, and the site was selected as the only site in 1987, by 1989 we knew that the site physically did not work for waste isolation. And in 1989 we explained this to members of the Legislature, we explained it to the governor, and the governor actually, because there were DOE siting guidelines, we could cite a guideline that was violated by the site.We had enough data where we could say this site should be disqualified.

And so in 1989 the Legislature passed a law making it illegal to store high-level waste in the state. So we had established a state policy opposing the mountain. And in that same year, the governor wrote a letter to the secretary of energy citing the regulation and the siting guideline that was violated by Yucca Mountain. And the answer that came back was: we're still studying the site. They would say the data are not conclusive. They would say, we're still investigating the site. Interesting enough, 10 years later in 1999, the next governor and an incoming governor, together wrote essentially the same letter, using additional data that we had collected and DOE collected over the past 10 years, telling them the same thing. The site should be disqualified here is the reason why. And we got the same answer: We're still studying the site. So, what it comes down to, is you know, in this defect in the system, and that is once you get down to naming only one site, you have no alternatives until you absolutely stop working on that site and just say you're not going do it anymore. The only incentive is to keep working on it, keep doing it and there's no way out for bureaucratic governmental organization as long they don't have an alternative.

And in this case, it turned out that they'll work on it as long as Congress is. The way we've gotten to the point now, where President Obama said, we're not going to do this anymore. The way that position has been implemented since 2010, Congress has appropriated no money. The only money that is in the system is a little bit of carry over money at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and that DOE didn't spend at the time that everything was shut down in 2010. So right now, as long as Congress doesn't appropriate any money, nothing happens. And that's the story of Yucca Mountain at this point.

Oleg: As a geologist, what is your view, is it possible to isolate radioactive waste from nature?

Steve: I guess I wouldn't be in this business at all if I thought that geologic isolation was not possible. I felt ever since the very beginning, when I started looking at the waste policy act, back in the 1980s. Now, I thought that there is a pretty good chance that we can find geologic settings that can isolate waste, and for the period of time necessary, which is essentially the hazardous lifetime of the waste, which could be, well, the US regulations says, you need to be able to, through remodeling efforts, using good data, need to be able to demonstrate for about 1 million years. Which, for Yucca Mountain, is not an impossible idea is not an impossible idea. People are not used to dealing with 1 million years for anything, looking at things geologically, and what we know about the geology, we can make reasonable projections, if we understand geologic processes that are going on and understand the processes that have gone on in the past. So I don't think geologic isolation is impossible. I think, we've learned a lot about the types of settings we might want to look for, and they're not entirely rare in the world, and in Sweden and Finland, theyre on to what I think is a good setting in terms of the combination of features that the site has.

It's a site that is hardly fractured at all, it doesn't have large fractures. The fractures in the rock are very small and not connected. The water in the rock is there and is hardly moving at all. If it's even moving. The water there is one of the things that tells you that it's not moving is that the water in the fractures in the rock is so old that it has no oxygen in it. And the reason it has no oxygen, is because the oxygen has been consumed and oxidizing minerals. So don't have a flow-through system. You have a very tight system. You don't have a lot of recharge water. Because it's not flowing through anything. And you have an anoxic system. One of the advantages of a system with no oxygen is that most radionuclides are essentially insoluble in an anoxic environment. So you have both physical and chemical protection. Which is a pretty good place to start.

 Oleg: You said about 1 million years for isolation. Who decided this?

Steve: The reason for 1 million years in the regulation in the US is specifically related to Yucca Mountain. In 1982 or 1992, we had an environmental protection agency radiation standard that was a generic standard and spoke to allowable releases from a repository. We discovered that Yucca Mountain violated that standard. It violated it in part because it was above the water table and we would have very early releases of carbon dioxide that contained carbon 14, a radioactive isotope for carbon, and nobody had anticipated this when the rule was written. So the Department of Energy didn't want to lose what they called an otherwise good site just because it violated one piece of the standard.

So it ended up, after the EPA would not change its standard, National Academy of Sciences would not recommend that the standard be changed, so the Department of Energy went to Congress and asked to have EPA instructed to write a standard specific to Yucca Mountain. And by the way, get rid of this thing that would be violated. So what the Congress was they passed an amendment to the policy act that told EPA to write a standard specific to Yucca Mountain that would be based not on releases, but on doses to individuals from releases, but they also said that the national Academy of Sciences needs to be asked to put together a panel that would look into the technical basis for a repository radiation standard for Yucca Mountain specifically.

So out of that panel came an analysis of what DOE knew about Yucca Mountain. And the panel believed, and I think correctly so, looking at what we and DOE and everyone sort of understood about the geology and hydrology that it is reasonable to project, on a model basis, out about 1 million years at Yucca Mountain, because of our knowledge of the past geology and geologic processes, it's reasonable to look out about 1 million years at Yucca Mountain. So the reason for the standard is specific to Yucca Mountain and that we as technical experts believe that you can project see a lot geologic processes and events out about 1 million years in order to sort of test the integrity of the site for isolation of waste. And as I've said, we know that it fails that test.

Oleg: Could you describe an optimal model of different stakeholders of cooperation? Who are the stakeholders who provide the safety?

Steve: I think you have, from my perspective, it's necessary to first do a screening for the places that you don't want to be, meaning, not geologic or geographic locations, or political location or anything, but just the kind of geology that you don't want to look at. And so it's an exclusionary screening. Once you have set out the exclusionary features, you could do this globally. You could say, were not even going to consider anything there. And then start saying, what are the priorities for good, better, and best, once you've gotten rid of the ones you know you don't want. You can start doing a prioritized screening, just for geological settings, before you even go look for where the settings might be.

This is pretty much what appears in International Atomic Energy Agency literature. This is pretty much what they say is the way you ought to start to look for things. Once you know what the priorities are. Then go geographically looking for places that have these types of settings. You don't have to, because geology is pretty well known, in just work that's been done over the last century, you can start looking for places that meet, at least, the screening criteria. Then on top of that, once you get to places that you think might be looking further at, then you have to have societal buy-in. You can't force it on anyone. Because all you have to do is start trying to force it on somebody, and everybody's going to revolt.

So, you say, okay, we have these possible sites, now is anyone willing for us to look? And look meaning, we do a little more intrusive study of the site. Not enough to prove it's a great site or that it's even a good site, but just look at it, to say, does it have anything that would immediately tell us that we should not be here? So I guess so what I'm sort of leading to is: my idea of screening is exclusionary screening, rather than inclusionary screening. I think you can build a logic trail if you do it that way. And of course as I said, you have to have societal buy-in. Part of the way you get societal buy-in is if you have a credible process and a believable process, and if people understand and believe that this is a credible and fair process with the type of screening I'm talking about, then some people may be willing to go the next step. Just to say, it's a credible process, let's go the next step, see if this site has features that would disqualify it, or features that would make it as good or better than what we need for waste isolation. So it needs to be a step process and you need to have credibility and believability. Riding along with all the technology, you can't do it as the nuclear industry worldwide has done it all along, trust us, we know everything. Don't worry yourself, we understand what you don't need to, we'll tell you that it's safe, and it is safe. This led us to things like Chernobyl and Fukushima. We can't do that with waste disposal because you only get one chance with waste disposal. If it fails, there's no fixing it.

Oleg: What is your thinking about the export of spent fuel rods to the United States?

Steve: I think ultimately the Nuclear Waste Policy Act says the federal government is responsible, in the long. And I guess I've watched the short-lived idea of Russia becoming the global repository. I've watched another company look first at Australia and South Africa. I guess the thing that concerns me most is that at this state of our maturity, internationally, I still think proliferation is an issue. And I don't think we want to have any one country that has an opportunity to be in charge of all the plutonium in the world. I just don't think globally we're mature enough for that. I'd rather we all had our own problems isolating, either permanently or in a secure way, our own plutonium, rather than having one country in charge of all of it when it doesn't mean I don't trust that country, but that I don't trust the future. If you have the world only stockpile of plutonium, I don't think we are mature enough to believe that it is safe.

 Oleg: Your interview is for a decommissioning online course for users in the U.S. and in Russia. Could I ask you to send a message to students about the nuclear issues, as a veteran of this field?

Steve: I think we have had enough experience to know a few things. One of them is that in this country specially, and in most other countries that have tried to deal with disposal of their used fuel, is: don't be in a big hurry. It's not important to do it right now. What is important is to figure out how to do it safely. You can't force the issue. We know how to store waste. You know how to store it pretty safely.And we also know we can store it under a regulatory system that allows us to keep track of it, a regulatory system that can at least be transparent, that doesn't mean it always is, but that can be transparent. And so we can have some trust and security. And that gives us time to think about how he wants to ultimately dispose of this.

And so I think the not rushing into it is a key issue. Another is we need to have some type of an institutional system that allows us deal with long term issues. Even had an ideal system for disposal of radioactive waste, it's going to take us another 25 to 30 years, even if we had a repository starting today, it's going to take another 25 or 30 years to even load that repository. So we need an institutional system that is not subject to political change on a regular basis, not subject to just changes, if Congress decides, we're spending too much money, so all of a sudden we have to slow down everything, just because they want to use that money for something else.

So I've done some thinking through the years, just because of my experience with originally writing the act, watching the act get created for political reasons, which it was, and watching the new act that was Yucca Mountain waste a lot of time and money. One of the things I thought is what kind of an institutional structure do we need, that can take us from the time a reactor stops, which doesn't mean it has to run a life time with all kinds of extensions, but any time a reactor stops, what institution can handle the issue of spent fuel from there to permanent disposal. And what it looks to me like, and I've never been able to get anyone to think hard about this, but we looked at this 15 or 20 years ago, we came to the idea that an institution that would take over the reactor when it stops, meaning would be an institution that would in charge of decommissioning through disposal. That may have a future.

Because what we would do is that in this country, every reactor that is running money into a decommissioning fund. And that money is, nominally, enough to commission your reactor, we know it isn't, but nominally according to the rules it is. So that institution, whatever it was, something that is at least sanctioned by the government, it doesn't have to be a government agency, but something sanctioned by the government, takes over the decommissioning funds and the closed reactor, manages both the storage, decommissioning, and a waste program, as a single institutional unit, and is financed by not only the commissioning funds, but also as we have it now, a nuclear waste fund, which is money generated by the generation of electricity from nuclear power plants. I think that would give at least the possibility of the long view, of what to do when the people who generate electricity at nuclear power plants have no incentive to do anything but make money on generating. They have no interest in decommissioning. So you need someone, or an institution, or an organization, that is interested in the real back end of the fuel cycle, which is when you stop electricity at the reactor. So this is just an idea and I would encourage who are coming after me, I'm almost done with my business here, I've done 35 years' worth, but people who are coming after my generation, I think, aside from the safety issues and the social acceptability and trust, the institutional issue is going to be the big one. Because nobody is used to dealing with institutional problems go on for decades and need a commitment for decades to continue doing something that you think is right, and you have good reason to believe is right, and also you're flexible enough, if you have little problems, you can adapt on the way. If you have a big problem, you have enough assurance to stop, and think.

 Oleg: Would a new international convention help? Do you think it is an interesting idea, to provide international standards, is it reasonable to do?

Steve: Yes, and I think internationally, we have had enough failures, that at least some of us around the world are thinking about why did these things fail? Is there really some new thinking that we can do that sort of outside of the pressures that are on the industry right now? Because the nuclear industry ultimately is not going to succeed. So, we're going to be seeing a lot of discomfort about decommissioning. And a growing comfort about the waste that the commissioning leaves behind.

So, yes, it's time for people to be able to think a new way. And that new way means that the incentive to just run the reactor and make money is diminishing as the incentive for public safety and welfare and well- being is growing. So, yes, I think it's a good idea and people are ready for it.

Oleg: Are you ready?

Steve: Yes, I'm ready.

Oleg: Brilliant interview.

Andrei: What about legislation?

Steve: At this point in the United States, we need new legislation. But I think there's a big dilemma about what that legislation can be. The Blue Ribbon Commission that President Obama put together, through the Secretary of Energy, came up with some good general thinking and came up with a couple of necessary principles. The key one that they understood, which most countries in the world have figured out after failures like ours, is that you have to have a voluntary system of some kind. You can't force this on anyone. So legislation has to understand that. Legislation also has to understand the longevity of the problem. So, you don't get into the situation where, next year, there is either going to be money or not. And it's always sort of a question of how much money because the implementer always wants more money than the giver is willing to give.

And then, as we were talking before, the institutional issue has to be resolved. And it's got to be resolved in a way if we have a well thought out program, it can go to the point of either, giving a good indication of success, or giving us an indication that we have to stop and rethink. We can't do a year to year, and at this point, I don't think we're mature enough, to write new legislation. I think we're going to have to sit for a while. And understand the mistakes we made, not only in this country, but in other countries, before we take urgent action once again. As I said before, we know how to store this stuff, there is nothing that is an imperative to move it, or to get it underground. Store it and sort of let the political heat die down a bit and maybe we can make some good decisions and we're not being driven by an industry that only wants to get this liability out of their back yard, so they can make more money. Because I think, as I said, those days are sort of going away anyway, and people are seeing through that.

So let's, at this point, I think new legislation would probably be precipitous. Meaning, it would cause new problems that we don't know how to solve. So my feeling is to relax and store and do things as you're suggesting.Gets some new minds thinking about how to deal with this that aren't locked into: run the reactor in the ground, and damn the waste.

Oleg: Maybe it's reasonable to think not only in the U.S. but internationally?

Steve: Right, the IEAE has done a pretty good job at focusing on safety issues. And internationally, everyone has pretty much bought into the general safety issues dealing with waste. But I think we need some new thinking on the social side of it. We all understand, safety is paramount, but if you're not going to have an organization, or a mindset, that allows for that to happen, then we're wasting our time. So I think, maybe not even in a greatly organized way, but we need, internationally, to come to a set of values that goes along with the safety set of values, and a social set of values. And if those two can work together, I think that may take us where we need to go. And o far, the values side of it has been run over by almost every country.

Oleg: So we need a new philosophy.

Steve: Correct.

Oleg: We need international standards. Not only technological, but public participation standards.

Steve: Right and you know, there is a Swedish group that, quite a few years ago, explored this whole idea of inter-generational equity. What responsibilities do we have to future generations? And nuclear waste is a big thing in that consideration. They did some very good thinking in terms of what responsibility do we have to future generations?Again, it's not just the safety, it's the philosophy. We, sort of simply, everyone pretty much buys into the fact that we shouldn't burden the future generations with risks that we are not willing to take. But that's not very deep thinking. We need much deeper thinking about what we are passing on to future generations that the nuclear energy industry has brought us, maybe more than we can possibly deal with, but that we have to deal with in some way.